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Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate that e-voting protocols based on threshold 
blind signatures from multiple authorities allow a coalition of  eligible voters to 
cast more than  votes. This property presents a serious violation of democracy of 
the voting process. We analyze the applicability of this violation and provide a 
generic solution using a public registration board and  modified threshold signature 
schemes. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Threshold blind signature schemes provide several highly desired properties in 
cryptography: privacy, security, robustness through redundancy, and avoidance of single 
points of failure. Many existing threshold blind signature schemes allow independent 
signature requests from multiple signers, i.e., no communication among the signers has 
to take place. Exactly this property applied in an e-voting protocol results in a severe 
violation of the democracy of the voting process. To the best of our knowledge, no 
protocol design based on threshold blind signature has ever been analyzed regarding this 
fact. 
 
1.1 Related Work 
 
One of the central technical challenges of designing an e-voting protocol is to 
simultaneously authenticate voters unequivocally while preserving the anonymity of 
their votes. One approach is to define the system based on blind signatures [Ch82], 
[Ch83]. The development of such systems is stimulated by the fact that blind signature 
schemes are simple to understand and implement, flexible to be adjusted to all sorts of 
settings, and suitable for large-scale elections. 
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Applying blind signatures to e-voting has first been proposed in [FOO92]. In the 
suggested protocol, known as FOO92, the voter first encrypts the vote and then requests 
a blind signature from the voting authority. The blind signature ensures that the content 
of the vote remains entirely disguised from the voting authority during the authorization 
process. The encrypted vote, together with the blind signature, is then sent over an 
anonymous channel to a public board. To open the votes for counting, the voter supplies 
the encryption key at the end of the voting period, again over an anonymous channel. 
 
One of the major drawbacks of FOO92 is its potential for single points of failure, e.g. it 
allows the authority to introduce votes for voters who abstain from casting their votes. 
This and other drawbacks have been addressed in the literature, and hence, many 
variations of the FOO92 protocol exist today [CC96], [Ok97], [Ba94], [Oh99], [RRN01], 
[CC97], and [He97]. 
 
One aspect which is common for nowadays protocols, is the replication of entities 
having the property of single point of failure. This replication allows the distribution of 
power as only a certain number of instances is needed in order to keep the protocol from 
failing, see for example [Du99], [Ki02], [JZF03], [Ba0], [AFT07], [AW07], and 
[CCM08]. 
 
1.2 Contribution and Overview 
 
 In Section 2, we will briefly illustrate the above-mentioned class of protocols. We will 
demonstrating a generic e-voting protocol based on threshold blind signature, where 
entities with the property of single point of failure are replicated. We will then analyze 
the attack on the provided generic scheme where any coalition of  eligible voters can 
cast more than  votes. Our analysis will provide us with some qualitative and 
quantitative results. 
 
In Section 3, we present a generic counter-measure against the above-mentioned attack, 
which is applicable to many existing e-voting schemes of that class. Section 4 gives a 
security analysis on the revisions made in Section 3, and Section 5 provides our 
conclusion. 
 
2  E-Voting Protocol using Threshold Blind Signature Scheme 
 
In the following we present a generic template e-voting protocol using threshold blind 
signatures. This protocol shall serve as the representative for various state-of-the-art e-
voting protocols of this class. For the sake of readability, certain aspects of the protocol 
will be omitted whereas a more detailed view will follow in a proceeding section. Even 
though other protocols are different in detail, they carry the same threshold properties. 
 
2.1  Threshold Blind Signature 
 
To avoid an entity to become a single point of failure, the entity is replicated  times 
where it is assumed that at least  replicates work in the sense of the protocol. The 
threshold  must be greater than 1 and smaller than . To maximize the robustness and 
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reliability of the protocol, the choice of  should make it unlikely that  or more 
replicates of an entity collude, or that  −  replicates fail. For e-voting protocols, 

  ≤  ≤

	  is often mentioned as a reasonable choice in multi-party computation 
[Hi01]. 
 
Concrete Examples of Blind Signature Schemes 
 
RSA Based Blind Signature. A blind signature, as introduced by Chaum [Ch82], is a 
form of digital signature, where the signer 
 is not supposed to see the real message to 
be signed, nor can the signer trace back the signature to the voter  (i.e., an unknown 
signature to an unknown message for a known requester). In order to achieve this goal, 
the data  to be signed is disguised before it is given to the signer using a blinding 
function. This function usually involves a public key  of the signer and a random 
number :  
 
1.  → 
: ′ = blind(, ). 
 
After the signer has signed the blinded data ′ with the private key , the resulting blind 
signature ′ can be transformed to an ordinary digital signature  using a corresponding 
unblinding function:  
 
2. 
 → : ′ = sign"(′), 
3. 
:  = unblind(′, ). 
 
In the classical RSA scheme, the blinding and unblinding functions consist of 
multiplying  with the blinding factor   and ′ with the unblinding factor $%, 
respectively. 
 
Schnorr Based Blind Signature. Blind signature schemes based on discrete logarithm 
were first introduced by Schnorr [Sc90]. In this scheme, the blinding and unblinding 
function consists of a typical Σ communication scheme: 
 
1. 
 → : ' = ()  mod ,, where - ∈/ 01,  = ($2 mod ,, and (, ,, 3 are setup 
parameters. 
2.  → 
: ′ = 4 − 5 where 4 = 6(, ),  = '789mod ,, and :, 5 ∈/ 01. 
3. 
 → :  ′; = - + '= mod 3. 
 
The resulting blind signature (, ′) for the blinded data ′ can be transformed to a 
signature (, ) for the data  by applying the corresponding unblinding function 
 = ′ + : mod 3. 
 
Threshold Blind Signatures 
 
A threshold blind signature scheme is a combination of a threshold signature scheme 
with blind signatures such that the data to be signed is not revealed to the signers, nor 
can the signers trace back the signature to the corresponding voter. 
4 
 
A threshold blind signature scheme can be defined as (, )-threshold signature scheme. 
This scheme lets  parties sign some common data, such that the outcome is a valid 
signature, if at least  parties have contributed to the signature [Bo03]. We can simply 
realize such a scheme by having each party sign the data  individually and then 
counting the number of valid signatures, in order to decide if the threshold has been 
reached. In the following we will use a generic description of blind signatures which can 
be adapted to any blind signature scheme: If > = (%, … , )) with  ≤ - ≤  denotes the 
individual signatures and @ = (%, … , A) the public keys of the signers, we denote the 
corresponding verification function by 
 
verify@,G(>, ) ∈ {I, JKL}. 
 
 
2.2  The Protocol 
 
The common e-voting protocol for such systems involves five entity types (voter, 
administration, the registration authority, the key authority, voting board), and consists 
of five consecutive phases:  
 
Phase 1: Initialization. The administration initiates the voting process by distributing 
the empty ballot, and the set of identities of legitimate voters together with their public 
keys to all necessary entities. 
 
The key authorities create the public-key / secret-key pair for a randomized asymmetric 
cryptography used during the voting process. In order to dissolve power, the key 
generation process is done in a distributed way, by using a threshold scheme such as 
[Ge03] of which its description is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Phase 2: Voter Preparation. The voter fills in the empty ballot and randomly encrypts 
the resulting vote by the public key provided by the key authorities. The resulting 
message is called the vote. At the end of this phase, the voter is ready to start the 
registration process. 
 
Phase 3: Registration. The purpose of the registration phase is to authorize legitimate 
voters to cast their votes. For this, the voter requests a signature for the blinded vote 
from at least  ≤  registration authorities. The blinding of the vote has to be generated 
for each replicated registration authority separately, as each replicate uses its own private 
key for signing. The voter sends the blinded vote to each registration authority where it 
will be signed and returned if and only if the following two conditions hold: The voter is 
allowed to vote, and the voter has not previously requested another signature during the 
voting process. Upon reception, the voter obtains the signatures for the vote by 
unblinding. If at least  signatures have been received then the voter is ready to start the 
vote casting process. 
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Phase 4: Vote Casting. The voter sends the vote together with the authorities' signatures 
anonymously to the public voting board. The board accepts the vote if and only if there 
are at least  valid signatures associated to it. 
 
Phase 5: Counting. The last phase of the e-voting protocol involves the opening of the 
votes to make them available for counting. For this, the key authorities publicly decrypt 
the cast votes using the secret part of the key pair. The votes are now ready to be counted 
by everyone.1 
 
 
2.3  Violation of Democracy 
 
We will now demonstrate the attack on democracy by exploiting the properties of the 
described threshold blind signature protocols.2 
 
Definition 1 (Democracy). A system is democratic if authorized voters can vote 
(eligibility), and if eligible voters can vote only once (uniqueness). 
 
Let us first analyze Phase 3 in more detail where the voter has to address a signing 
request to at least  replicates of the registration authority. The voter generates a blinded 
message for each signer, whereas each blinded message consists of the same vote. Each 
signer will sign the received message and returns it to the voter. The vote will be 
declared valid if at least  different and valid signatures for the vote are provided. 
 
This protocol implicitly violates democracy and therefore can be used as an attack on the 
e-voting system. As only  signatures are needed in order to render a vote valid,  −  
signatures can be used for another vote. One voter cannot get more than one valid vote, 
but a group of voters can. The following example shall demonstrate a possible attack: 
 
• available registration authorities:  = 4  
• authority signature threshold:  = 3  
 
A fair voter ; generates four blinded messages (one blinded message P′Q;  per authority 

Q, 1 ≤ R ≤ 4) containing the same vote P;: 
  
 
% 
 
 
	 ; P′%;  P′; P′; P′	; 
 
 
Each authority signs the blinded message and returns the signature Q; ′ to the voter. To 
cast the vote P; , the voter sends it together with three out of four unblinded signatures Q;  
anonymously to the voting board. The voter discards the remaining signature. 
                                                          
1
 This phase can be adapted in manifold ways, such as re-encryption to gain receipt freeness or homomorphic 
counting instead of individual decryption. Since these adoptions distract from the intended focus of this paper 
and, hence, will not be followed any further. 
2
 Many to our colleague Emmanuel Benoist for pointing this out. 
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A malicious voter group consisting of three colluding voters ), S, T, where -, L,  ∈{1, … , } and - ≠ L ≠  can generate an additional vote PV resulting in four 
independent votes: 
  
  
 
%   
   
   
	 )  P′%)  P′)  P′)  P′	V  S   P′%S   P′S   P′V   P′	S   T  P′%T  P′V  P′T  P′	T  
 
 
The following holds true: 
 
• P) is rendered valid by the signatures %), ), ) of authorities 
%, 
, and 
;  
• PS  is rendered valid by the signatures %S, S, 	S  of authorities 
%, 
, and 
	;  
• PT is rendered valid by the signatures %T, T, 	T of authorities 
%, 
, and 
	; and  
• PV is rendered valid by the signatures V, V, 	V of authorities 
, 
, and 
	.  
 
This is possible as the different registration authorities operate independently from each 
other and, hence, no synchronization takes place amongst them. Even though the attack 
is not possible on an exponential scale, it is still significant. The quantitative impact of 
the attack is proportional to the number of colluding voters. 
 
Due to the nature of threshold there always exists a subset of size  −  authorities not 
needed in order to get sufficient signatures for a valid vote. Let 2 be the size of a 
malicious colluding voter group. Hence, the maximum number of additional votes WX 
that can be rendered valid by the malicious voter group, is: 
 
WX =  Y −  2Z  
 
For the threshold values ,  such that   ≤  ≤

	  (see Section 2.1), WX is in the range 
of:  
[\
 ≤ WX ≤
[\
   
 
The violation of democracy shown above is present in all protocols based on threshold 
blind signature where the blinding procedure results in a different message for every 
individual signer. Therefore, a common registration board must be used as knowledge 
base for synchronization amongst the registration authorities. 
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3  E-Voting Protocol Using a Public Registration Board 
 
A public board is a broadcast channel with memory. Data can be broadcast by anyone. 
By using a guard,3 the accepted data can be restricted to authorized participants only. 
Once published, the data can be read by everyone but cannot be altered anymore. The 
concept of the public board has been introduced by Benaloh et al. [CF85] and [Be87] 
and brings verifiability to e-voting schemes. 
 
To prevent the violation of democracy, we introduce a public registration board. We 
assume that the guard of the board guarantees the following properties: 
 
• Only eligible voters can append an entry (using the public key for 
identification). 
• Each eligible voter can append only once. 
• Only eligible registration authorities can append signatures (using the public 
key for identification). 
• Each eligible registration authority can append only one signature per eligible 
voter entry. 
 
 
3.1  Revised Voting Protocol 
 
By introducing a public board for the registration process, the voter no longer 
communicates to the registration authorities. Instead, the blinded hash of the encrypted 
vote is broadcast to the public registration board. In addition, the registration authorities 
no longer communicate to the voters. Instead, the registration authorities read the public 
registration board entries and broadcast the signed voter entries back to it. Therefore, the 
initial Phase 3 of the generic protocol in Section 2.3 needs the following revision: 
 
Phase 3: Registration. The purpose of the registration phase is to authorize legitimate 
voters to cast only their votes. For this, the voter requests a signature for the blinded hash 
of the encrypted vote from at least  ≤  registration authorities. The voter does so by 
broadcasting the blinded hash of the encrypted vote along with the public voter key to 
the public registration board. The registration board will accept the message if and only 
if the following two conditions hold: The voter is allowed to vote, and the voter has not 
yet requested another signature during the voting process. These conditions also prevent 
the public registration board from being flooded. Each registration authority will sign 
one blinded hash per voter and broadcasts this signature back to the public registration 
board. Then, the voter can obtain the signatures for the hash by unblinding them. If at 
least  signatures have been added to the public registration board then the voter is ready 
to start the vote casting process. 
 
The following revision of the Phase 4 prevents the board from being flooded: 
                                                          
3
 A guard is a predicate on a candidate entry and on the board's state. The predicate must evaluate to true for 
the entry being added to the board. If the predicate evaluates to true then we call the candidate entry to be 
valid, and it is added. Otherwise, if the predicate evaluates to false then the candidate entry is discarded. 
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Phase 4: Vote Casting. The voter sends the encrypted vote, the vote hash, and the 
authorities' signatures anonymously to the voting board. The board accepts the vote if 
and only if there are at least  valid signatures associated to the vote hash. 
 
 
3.2  Public Registration Board Collective 
 
The public registration board presented at the beginning of Section 3 may suffer from 
some catastrophic failure that prohibits it from fulfilling its duty. It may no longer be 
able to service its regular clients, or it may be victim of a denial of service attack, with 
the same effect that prevents regular clients to communicate successfully with the board. 
 
In [HL09], a scheme for a collective of public boards is presented being based on  
peers of identical public boards. As long as a threshold set of  out of  public boards 
function correctly, the integrity of the entries on the boards can be guaranteed by the 
collective. Each peer accepts and stores the same information as outlined in the 
beginning of Section 3. In order to write information onto the board, voters and 
authorities send their messages to one peer of their choice. The peer in turn will then 
form a threshold set  of peers to guarantee (in terms of a receipt) the publishing of the 
message. 
 
There are two versions of the collective: The first one having a synchronized history, all 
peers maintain the same order among the accepted messages. The second version 
supports the concept of an unsynchronized history which satisfies our requirements. To 
read all messages previously published, however, clients need to consult  −  + 1 
peers. 
 
 
3.3  Revised Threshold Blind Signature Schemes 
 
The revision of Phase 3 requires a property which is not present in the normal schemes 
as defined in Section 2.1. It requires that each signing party (registration authority) is 
given the same blinded data ′ such that the very same data is signed by all parties. 
Therefore, a new assumption has to be introduced: The blinding and the unblinding 
function, 
 
′ = blind@(, ), > = unblind@(>′, ), 
 
depend on the public keys @ of all signing parties. 
 
RSA Based Threshold Blind Signature 
 
To realize such a scheme based on RSA, we use a common blinding factor ]⋯_ and 
individual unblinding factors $(]⋯`a]`b]⋯_) to obtain classical RSA signatures 
; = "` . Note that if ; denotes the modulus for the public key ;, then % ⋯ A will 
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be an appropriate modulus for ]⋯_. The individual modulus ; can then be used by 
the c-th signer to sign the common blinded data ′ and by the recipient of the blind 
signatures to do the unblinding. 
 
Schnorr Based Threshold Blind Signature 
 
To realize such a scheme based on Schnorr, we can use the threshold blind signature 
scheme introduced by Jinho Kim et al. [KKL02]. The original scheme describes the 
following message flow for the message signing procedure:4 
 
1.  → 
;: d; = ∏  G)f%,)g; ))$;  
2. 
; → : ; = (G`ℎi`  mod , where , I ∈/ 01 and (, ℎ, , setup parameters 
3.  → 
;: ′ = 4 − j where 4 = 6(, ̂), ̂ = (lℎmnomod ,,  = ∏  G;f% ; and 5, p, j ∈/ 01  
4. 
; → : (q; , r;) where q; = ; − ′;d;  mod 3, r; = I; − ′;d;  mod 3 with ; , ;  public key of 
;. 
 
However, even this protocol is still prone to the attack, if used without public registration 
board, and hence the message flow has to be adapted5 in order to gain democracy using 
this protocol: 
 
1. 
; ⇒ tuK: (; , c[) for each eligible voter  
2.  ⇒ tuK: (d; , ′, cv`) for at least  authorities 
3. 
; ⇒ tuK: (q;, r; , c[) 
 
Each authority calculates the commitment for each eligible voter in advance and places 
them on the public board next to the voter id. Any voter can then start the blinding and 
signature process. The voter is allowed to present one and only one blinded data ′ on 
the public registration board. 
 
4  Security Analysis 
 
The question whether the attack presented in Section 2 is still possible, can be denied 
rather intuitively. Every voter can send only one message (a commitment to the voters 
vote) to be signed to the public registration board. Every registration authority provably 
signs the very same message per voter. Therefore, no threshold attack can be executed 
any more, and democracy is established under such circumstances. 
 
We now have to prove that the revision does not introduces other security issues for the 
whole e-voting process. 
 
                                                          
4
 For the sake of readability, the protocol steps presented are stripped down to the signing process. Please refer 
to the original paper for a more detailed view of the complete protocol. 
5
 ⇒ indicates that each message has to be signed by the sender. 
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Anonymity: The introduction of the public registration board seems to raise an 
anonymity issue. But this is not the case as the only information that can be learned 
through the public registration board is the fact that some voter initiated the e-voting 
process. But nothing can be learned of the vote itself nor its containing data. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to trace the voter's vote. This results in the inability to 
know if a voter really finished the e-voting process by casting the vote. 
 
Democracy: In the revised protocol the registration authorities do not sign the blinded 
encrypted vote any more but its blinded hash-value. The consequence of this refinement 
comes into operation only during the vote casting process. As a blindly signed message 
is a valid message, the public voting board accepts it as being authorized. As a 
consequence of this, the voting board could be tainted by receiving signed messages 
from the public registration board. These votes, however, would be invalid and would 
not affect the final tally. On the other hand, this is a serious issue, and it can be 
addressed by letting the voting board to accept only the following tuple: Encrypted vote, 
and the signatures of the hash-value of the encrypted vote. 
 
Persistence: The use of the public registration board implies the permanent storage of 
the signatures. Hence, the voter does not need to keep them anymore. The only 
information the voter needs to keep at a safe place is the blinding factor. 
 
Privacy: If all involved registration authorities collude against a single voter, the voter's 
privacy is still warranted by the blinding factor the voter has chosen, since finding the 
correct blinding factor is considered hard [Be01], [KKL02]. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we demonstrated that any blind signature protocol with threshold bears an 
intrinsic weakness on democracy and unforgeability of votes, if no public registration 
board is in use. The public registration board acts as a point of synchronization, where 
each voter has to give the commitment to only one single blinded message, ready to be 
signed by all signing authorities. Therefore, a public board not only serves as a means 
for individual and universal verifiability. The public registration board is an imperative 
instrument of communication to multiple authorities within a threshold system. 
Furthermore, we showed that the special requirement, the provably signing the same 
data, by multiple signers within the threshold signature scheme based on RSA or on 
Schnorr can be achieved by a refinement of the blinding / unblinding process. 
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